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1. Introduction 
In markets with posted price competition sellers independently choose prices, which are pub-
licly communicated to buyers on a take- it-or-leave- it basis. Such posted pricing is common in 
retail markets as well as in industries in which regulatory agencies require that prices be filed 
with them and that discounts not be granted. This type of competition has been studied both 
theoretically and experimentally. The theoretical work by Bertrand (1883) gave rise to what is 
known as the Bertrand paradox: If marginal costs are constant then two firms are enough for 
equilibrium prices to equal marginal cost. Subsequent theoretical work has consisted in pro-
posing price competition models which “resolved” this paradox. Vives (1999) discusses the 
theoretical work on price competition in detail. 
Early experimental work on posted prices, like that of Williams (1973) and Plott and Smith 
(1978), was not based on formal models of price competition. Instead, it took the Walrasian 
outcome as the natural benchmark for evaluating behaviour. More recently, a number of ex-
perimental studies have investigated price competition on the basis of designs closely con-
nected to theoretical models. Holt (1995) surveys the experimental research on posted prices. 
Davis and Holt (1994) and Kruse, Rassenti, Reynolds, and Smith (1994) study price competi-
tion in environments in which the equilibrium prediction involves a price distribution with 
average prices above marginal cost in the spirit of the first theoretical resolution of the Be r-
trand paradox proposed by Edgeworth (1925). Both studies find price dispersion distinct but 
qualitatively similar to those predicted by Nash equilibrium. The study by Morgan, Orzen, 
and Sefton (2001) experimentally examines a model on price competition with informed and 
uninformed consumers. Informed consumers search for the best price, but uninformed con-
sumers are captive to a firm. As a result, pure strategy equilibria do not exist. The authors find 
observed price distributions to be different from the prediction, but the comparative statics of 
the strategic equilibrium to be supported.  
One of the central themes of the economic analysis of oligopoly is how the number of firms 
affects prices when there are only few competitors in the market. Dufwenberg and Gneezy 
(2000) address this question in what can be seen as the first direct test of the Bertrand paradox 
as such. They study the effects of market concentration in a one-shot price competition 
framework with constant margina l cost and inelastic demand. In their experiments, price is 
above marginal cost for the case of two firms but equal to that cost for three and four firms.1 
In their results two firms are not enough to get prices down to marginal cost but three firms 
are. In a sense, the Bernard paradox remains, since the experimental results do not exhibit the 
intuitively expected negative relation between the number of firms and the price-cost margin. 
                                                                 
1 With duopolies, Dufwenberg, Gneezy, Goeree, and Nagel (2002) find that the introduction of price floors (the 
minimum feasible price is above marginal costs) lead to lower average prices compared to the standard Bertrand 
game. Thus, the exception for the two-firm case is weakened when price floors are introduced. 
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Selten and Apesteguía (2002) experimentally study price competition in a model of spatial 
competition. Their setting involves positive profit margins in the Cournot equilibrium, but 
these margins are constant in the number of firms. In line with this prediction, they find very 
little difference in average prices across their treatments with three, four, and five firms, and 
average prices are close to, but slightly above those chosen in equilibrium.  
Abbink and Brandts (2002) examine the effects of the number of firms in an experimental 
design in which price competition can lead to positive equilibrium price-cost margins. Their 
design is based on the theoretical model by Dastidar (1995) in which there are multiple equi-
libria in pure strategies, compatible with price-cost margins being decreasing in the number of 
firms. Firms operate under decreasing returns to scale and have to serve the whole market. 
The experimental results are that average prices indeed decrease with the number of firms, but 
this effect can mainly be attributed to the declining prevalence of collusion. The most fre-
quent market price is one that is reached by a simple imitation dynamic, and this price is in-
variant to the number of firms. 
We present an experimental study based on another theoretical proposal to resolve the Ber-
trand paradox. Spulber (1995) analyses an extension of the standard Bertrand model in which 
marginal costs are not common knowledge among the competitors. Rather, they are, for each 
firm independently, drawn from a distribution and private information for the individual 
firms. This is an a priori very appealing model, since it is quite natural to consider that firms 
only have approximate information about rivals’ costs. 
This incomplete information about costs changes the equilibrium prediction dramatically: 
Prices are now set substantially above marginal costs. The realised market prices will depend 
on the random draws, but in expectation prices decrease with the number of firms so that a 
sufficient increase of the number of firms implies a prediction of lower prices. The equilib-
rium prediction is in pure, not in mixed strategies.   
With our work we wish to contribute to delineating a more complete picture of price competi-
tion from an experimental viewpoint. In particular, we are interested in what price and effi-
ciency levels arise and how they depend on the number of firms. With respect to price levels 
we are interested in finding out whether prices remain above Walrasian levels with three or 
four firms. 
Numerous studies report results on related issues from quantity competition environments. 
Huck, Normann and Oechssler (1999, 2001) provide results and a recent survey of work on 
the effects of market concentration under repeated quantity competition. 2 Their conclusion is 
that duopolists sometimes manage to collude, but that in markets with more than three firms 
collusion is difficult. With exactly three firms, Offerman, Potters, and Sonnemans (2002) ob-
serve that market outcomes depend on the information environment: Firms collude when they 
                                                                 
2 Huck, Konrad, Müller, and Normann (2002) study market outcomes when the number of firms decreases 
through mergers. They find that merged firms produce significantly more than firms without a merger history. 
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are provided with information on individual quantities, but not individual profits. In many 
instances, total average output exceeds the Nash prediction and furthermore, these deviations 
are increasing in the number of firms. The price-cost margins found in experimental repeated 
quantity competition are, hence, qua litatively consistent with the Cournot prediction for the 
static game.  
Our results show that, in accordance with Spulber (1995), market prices indeed decrease sig-
nificantly with the number of firms, but – on average – always stay above marginal costs. In 
this sense, our results back the theoretical resolution of the Bertrand paradox. However, com-
pared to the equilibrium prediction, prices tend to be lower in all treatments. This is good 
news for consumers, but it does not lift total surplus beyond the leve l that would result from 
equilibrium play. Rather, observed surplus and predicted total surplus are very close to one 
another. The reason is that efficiency gains from closer to marginal cost pricing are cancelled 
out by occasional displacements, i.e. by quantities produced by firms other than the one with 
the lowest costs. In relation to the highest possible surplus the actual surplus increases with 
the number of firms. 
2. The model and the experimental design 
2.1. The model 
In our experimental markets the demand function is linear with a slope of 1, in order to 
choose the simplest formulation of such a function. We chose an inverse demand function 
p = 99 – Q  
for our study, where Q is the total quantity demanded.3 Each firm i’s cost function is linear 
with constant marginal costs ci, where the level of ci is randomly drawn from a uniform distri-
bution on the interval [0, 99] and is only known by that firm. The interval covers the entire 
range from zero to the prohibitive price. By choosing such a wide range we focus on an envi-
ronment in which the effect of cost uncertainty is most pronounced. The random draws for 
each firm are independent from one another. There are no fixed costs.  
Firms set their prices simultaneously. Therefore, no firm knows the choice of any other firm 
when setting its own price. As in the standard Bertrand model, only firms setting the lowest 
price produce. If one firm sets the lowest price alone, it serves all demand at that price, if two 
or more firms set a common lowest price, each of them sells an equal share of that demand. 
There are no capacity constraints, each firm can (and must) always serve its entire demand.  
A firm’s strategy assigns a price to any possible realisation of the cost parameter. In equilib-
rium, firms set prices increasing in their cost parameters and substantially above marginal 
                                                                 
3 The intersect of 99 was chosen for practical reasons. In the experiment, subjects only needed to choose between 
all numbers with up to two digits. 
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costs. The reason why price competition does not drive equilibrium prices down to marginal 
costs is intuitive: Upward deviations from the firm’s marginal costs will not necessarily result 
in the loss of all demand, since it is possible that the competitors’ costs and prices are higher 
than the own ones. Rather, the firm faces a trade-off: By increasing its mark-up on its mar-
ginal costs, it will increase its profit in the case that its price is still the lowest. The probability 
of winning the market, on the other hand, becomes smaller the higher the firm sets its mark-
up. The strategic situation is similar to that faced by a bidder in a first-price auction with in-
dependent private values: In such an auction, bidders’ values for an item on auction are inde-
pendently drawn from a common distribution, where only the own valuation is known to a 
bidder when making his bid. Spulber (1995) makes extensive use of this analogy and charac-
terises the equilibria of Bertrand competition with private cost information using techniques 
developed for auction theory.  
Spulber (1995) analyses the properties of the equilibrium prediction for a very general model 
of this kind. While the general case involves some complexity, the equilibrium price functions 
for the symmetric case with linear demand are straightforward to compute.4 A firm maximises 
its expected profit by setting the price p as a linear function of the cost parameter c as 
 
n
nc
cp
?
?
?
1
99
)( . 
For a given n, the equilibrium price function is linear in the cost parameter, but not propor-
tional to it. If the costs are zero, the firm will charge a high mark-up to maximise its expected 
profit. If the costs are maximal, however, the firm sets a price equal to its marginal costs. Fig-
ure 1 depicts the equilibrium price functions for n = 2, n = 3, and n = 4. 
2.2. The conduct of the experiment 
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Eco-
nomics (CeDEx) of the University of Nottingham. The software for the experiment was de-
veloped using the RatImage programming package (Abbink and Sadrieh (1995)). Subjects 
were recruited by e-mail from a database of students, who had previously registered at CeDEx 
to express their willingness in participating in experiments. Each subject was allowed to par-
ticipate in only one session, and no subject had participated in experiments similar to the pre-
sent one. The subjects were undergraduate students from a wide range of disciplines. 
In our experimental sessions subjects interacted in fixed groups of 2, 3 or 4 for 50 identical 
rounds. At the beginning of the round, the unit cost parameter was drawn randomly, visua l-
ised by a “one-armed bandit” on the terminal’s computer screen. The computer drew random 
numbers for each round and each individual independently; we did not use controlled lottery 
outcomes. Since the treatments involve a different number of firms and thus a different num-
                                                                 
4 See Wolfstetter (1997:407ff.). When using the term “equilibrium”, we always refer to the equilibrium predic -
tion for risk-neutral firms. 
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ber of random draws in each round, it is not possible to use the same set of realisations for all 
treatments. The use of completely independent draws creates some sampling variation, as 
subjects in different treatments observe different samples of cost parameters. However, since 
we conducted sessions with 50 rounds and a large number of independent markets, such ef-
fects do not affect the comparability of our treatments substantially. 
Figure 1 
Once the cost parameter was drawn, each subject had to choose a price between 0 and 99 tal-
ers (the fictitious experimental currency) per unit. For convenience, cost parameters and price 
choices were restricted to integers. After each round each subject was informed about the 
prices chosen by each of the other subjects in the market as well as about all subjects’ sales 
quantities. As in actual markets prices are typically publicly announced, but cost information 
is kept private, we did not inform subjects about their competitors’ cost parameters even after 
the round. Consequently, subjects were told only their own revenue, costs and profit.  
The same subjects played in the same market throughout the session to reflect the repeated 
game character of actual oligopoly markets. Thus, our setting can be seen as a stylised model 
of an oligopoly in which firms face strong fluctuations of costs, e.g. caused by changing natu-
ral factors. Subjects were not told with whom of the other participants they were in the same 
group. 
To accommodate some losses, subjects were granted a capital balance of 3000 talers at the 
outset of each session. 5 The total earnings of a subject from participating in this experiment 
                                                                 
5 If this capital balance was used up, the participant was “bankrupt” and the remaining subjects in that market 
played in a smaller market. Because this creates a very different market environment, we did not use observa-
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were equal to his capital balance plus the sum of all the profits he made during the experiment 
minus the sum of his losses. A session lasted for about 75 minutes (this includes the time 
spent to read the instructions). At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their total 
earnings anonymously in cash, at a conversion rate of one British pound for 2000 (n = 2), 
1250 (n = 3) and 1000 (n = 4) talers. Subjects earned between £6.13 and £21.20 with an ave r-
age of £11.26, which is considerably more than students’ regular wage in Nottingham.6 At the 
time of the experiment, the exchange rate to other major currencies was approximately US-
$ 1.50 and EUR 1.50 for one pound. 
We conducted two sessions with 10 and 14 subjects for n = 2, two sessions with 12 and 15 
subjects for n = 3, and three sessions with 20, 16, and 16 subjects for n = 4.7 Subjects interact 
with each other within groups but not across groups so that each group can be considered as a 
statistically independent observation. Thus, we gathered 12 independent observations for 
n = 2, 9 independent observations for n = 3, and 11 independent observations for n = 4.  
Our analysis primarily consists of nonparametric tests performed on these data points. Most 
analyses comprise of pairwise comparisons of the treatments. For these we use Fisher’s two-
sample randomisation test, applied to test statistics (e.g. average prices or surplus levels) from 
the independent observations.8 In some occasions we also apply tests to statistics within one 
sample, as e.g. when comparing our observations to the equilibrium prediction. In this case, 
we use the nonparametric binomial test. The choice of the test methods used in the following 
was made before the experiment was conducted.  
3. Results 
3.1. Average prices and the number of firms  
The three treatments of our experiment allow us to study the effect of market concentration on 
market outcomes. In particular, we can analyse whether an increase in the number of competi-
tors results in lower transaction or market prices. Table 1 indicates that, on average, this is the 
case. The table shows average market prices, i.e. the lowest of chosen prices, for the different 
groups over the 50 rounds of the experiment, ordered from the lowest to the highest for each 
value of n. Average prices are decreasing in the number of firms. Fisher’s two-sample ran-
domisation test rejects the null hypothesis of equal average prices at a significance level of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
tions with bankruptcies in our data analysis. Overall, two participants went bankrupt. Losses can occur if sub-
jects charge prices below their unit costs. 
6 These figures do not include the two participants who went bankrupt. They received a show-up fee of £3. 
7 The show-up rate for the sessions was quite erratic. Therefore, the number of participants was different across 
sessions. 
8 This test can be seen as a non-parametric variant of the t-test, with which differences in the mean of two sam-
ples can be detected. For a discussion of the power of this test see Moir (1998). 
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? =0.005 (two-sided) for all pairwise comparisons of treatments. Therefore, our results pro-
vide qualitative support for the equilibrium prediction of expected prices decreasing with n. 
Table 1: Average market prices 
Group No. n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
35.80 
40.40 
42.80 
42.88 
49.20 
51.08 
51.24 
51.38 
51.64 
51.64 
57.28 
57.82 
29.58 
32.26 
33.16 
34.94 
35.14 
36.64 
37.26 
37.88 
38.68 
25.02 
25.52 
26.28 
26.52 
27.68 
28.66 
29.08 
33.56 
33.72 
35.10 
35.48 
Average 48.60 35.06 29.69 
Equilibrium9 53.70 43.02 35.87 
The question arises whether prices tend to increase or decrease over the fifty rounds of the 
experiment. Figure 2 shows the evolution of average prices, for each round averaged over all 
markets within a treatment. Visually, the diagram does not strongly suggest any tendency in 
either direction. 
To test for trends statistically, we use the following method. We compute, for each session 
separately, non-parametric Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the market price 
and the round number. Using these as summary statistics, we apply the binomial test to detect 
a systematic tendency to rising or falling prices. The binomial test rejects the null hypothesis 
at a one-sided 5% level if at least 10 out of 12 observations for duopolies, 8 out of 9 observa-
tions for triopolies, and 9 out of 11 observations for tetrapolies point in the same direction. 
Table 2 shows the outcome of this analysis. In none of the treatments, the null hypothesis of 
no trend can be rejected.10 
 
                                                                 
9 In all of the following analysis, the equilibrium predictions we note are based on the unit costs actually drawn 
in the experiment. 
10 The detection of trends is relatively hard in our experiment, as unit costs vary much over time. Thus prices are 
naturally very volatile. There is no straightforward way to normalise the prices, as mark-ups on them are not 
independent from cost levels either.  However, since our analysis entails 50 rounds, even weak trends in a market 
should make it likely that a positive or negative Spearman rank correlation coefficient would show up. Notice 
that our method does not require the individual coefficients to be significant, as they are only used as summary 
statistics for the binomial test. 
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Figure 2 
Table 2: Correlation between round number and market price 
Treatment  
Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 Total 
positive 
negative 
7 
5 
3 
6 
6 
5 
16 
16 
Total 12 9 11 32 
3.2. Asking prices 
The above results clearly indicate that average prices tend to decrease with the number of 
firms. There are two possible causes for this effect. First, more aggressive pricing behaviour 
could be prevalent in larger markets. This would naturally lead to lower average market 
prices. However, even if price setting behaviour were the same across treatments, we would 
observe the phenomenon of decreasing market prices. This is because the market price is the 
minimum of the n asking prices. Given identical price functions, the lowest of four asking 
prices would be lower on average than the lowest of three or two asking prices. 
Table 3 shows average asking prices, i.e. the average of all chosen prices, for the different 
groups over the 50 rounds of the experiment, ordered from the lowest to the highest for each 
value of n. The table shows that duopolists ask for considerably higher prices than both trio-
polists and tetrapolists, but the difference between triopolies and tetrapolies is only marginal. 
In fact, Fisher’s two-sample randomisation test rejects the null hypothesis of equal average 
asking prices for the comparison of both n = 2 versus n = 3 and n = 2 versus n = 4 at a signifi-
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cance level of ?  = 0.005 (one-sided), while the comparison of n = 3 versus n = 4 is not sig-
nificant (one-tail p = 0.29). Thus, increasing the number of firms from two to three induces 
significantly more aggressive pricing behaviour, while increasing the number of competitors 
further to four firms has no significant effect on the mark-ups charged by the firms. The effect 
on prices, therefore, then stems from the effect that the minimum of the competitors’ unit 
costs tends to be lower with more firms. 
Table 3: Average asking prices 
Group No. n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
53.69 
56.07 
57.31 
57.83 
62.30 
62.48 
63.42 
63.49 
63.74 
64.93 
65.68 
68.61 
51.55 
53.19 
55.66 
55.89 
55.99 
57.14 
57.17 
58.44 
58.89 
48.08 
51.35 
51.49 
53.01 
55.31 
55.37 
55.47 
58.14 
58.29 
59.90 
60.14 
Average 61.63 55.99 55.14 
Equilibrium 65.25 61.45 59.19 
An additional perspective on different pricing behaviour across treatments can be obtained in 
the following way. Estimate a linear regression for each subject’s pricing function. Then take 
the resulting intercepts and focus on the comparison of the distributions of the intercepts 
across treatments. Figure 4 shows the three corresponding cumulative distributions and one 
can see that the differences between n = 4 and the other two cases are quite substantial, 
whereas the two distributions for n = 3 and n = 4 are rather alike. 
3.3. Pricing behaviour as compared with the theoretical prediction 
The bottom row of tables 1 and 3 indicate the equilibrium prediction of market prices and 
asking prices. The comparison of observed averages with the equilibrium averages already 
suggests that experimental firms tend to price more aggressively than predicted in equilib-
rium. Figure 5 shows all the prices that have been asked in the three treatments, plotted 
against the corresponding unit costs. In addition, two benchmarks have been drawn into the 
figures: The diagonal line depicts Walrasian prices, equal to marginal (unit) costs, which lead 
to zero profits for the firm serving the market. The second line, above the zero-profit line, is 
the equilibrium prediction for the case of risk-neutrality. 
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Figure 4 
It can be seen that in fact the majority of asking prices are in between the equilibrium predic-
tion and the marginal cost pricing line. The prices charged by the firms do contain a mark-up 
on the marginal costs, but this mark-up is substantially lower than predicted in equilibrium.11 
Table 4 shows the number of asking prices that are above, equal to, and below the equilibrium 
prediction. 
Table 4: Asking prices compared to the equilibrium prediction 
Treatment 
Asking price  
as compared to equilibrium n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 
Above equilibrium 
as in equilibrium 
below equilibrium 
30.4% 
3.6% 
66.0% 
14.9% 
2.6% 
82.5% 
17.8% 
2.0% 
80.1% 
The table indicates that the underpricing, as compared to equilibrium, is less pronounced in 
duopolies than in the markets with more firms. Broken down to individual markets, we can 
observe more asking prices below than above the equilibrium prediction in all 9 markets with 
three and all 11 markets with four firms. For duopolies, this is the case for only 8 of the 12 
                                                                 
11 This is reminiscent of a phenomenon observed in independent private value auction experiments (see Kagel 
(1995)). In that context buyers were observed to bid above the equilibrium prediction for risk-neutrality, which 
corresponds to below equilibrium pricing in our model. Several explanations of this fact have been suggested, 
among them non-linear utility, non-linear probability weighting and buyers enjoying the fact of winning as such. 
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markets, while in 4 markets more prices above than below equilibrium can be observed.12 A 
possible explanation is that with two firms, participants may attempt to collude in order to 
establish higher and more profitable prices. This seems relatively easier in duopolies than in 
larger markets, as co-ordination requirements are less. However, it is generally hard to estab-
lish successful co-operation in the present model. Firms can only observe the prices set by 
their competitors, but not the costs. The competitors’ prices, however, will depend on their 
costs, such that attempts to signal one’s willingness to co-operate are hard to transmit, as the 
prices are difficult to interpret in that way. As a result, pricing is still quite aggressive even in 
duopolies.13 
 
Figure 5 
                                                                 
12 If we test the null hypothesis that deviations in both directions are equally likely, the binomial test rejects the 
null hypothesis for both the n = 3 and the n = 4 treatment at a significance level of ?  = 0.005 (one-sided), while 
for duopolies the effect is not significant.  
13 The observation that duopolists tend to collude while firms in larger markets do less so has been found in a 
number of oligopoly experiments on different models, e.g. Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2001), or Abbink 
and Brandts (2002). 
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3.4. Efficiency 
The three treatments of our experiment enable us to compare efficiency levels for different 
degrees of market concentration. Below we present information on both absolute and relative 
efficiency. The measure for efficiency we look at is the total surplus, conventionally defined 
as the sum of consumer and producer surplus. This would be maximised if (1) the good is 
produced by the firm with the lowest unit costs, and (2) the market price equals the unit costs 
of this firm. 14 Table 5 shows average total surplus – in talers – for the different groups over 
the 50 rounds of the experiment, ordered from the lowest to the highest for each value of n.  
Table 5. Average total surplus in the individual markets 
Group No. n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
1856 
2045 
2154 
2215 
2229 
2240 
2376 
2392 
2443 
2525 
2622 
2657 
2596 
2634 
2713 
2714 
2795 
2813 
2910 
2965 
3235 
2752 
2800 
2861 
2896 
3043 
3149 
3242 
3295 
3342 
3405 
3420 
 
Average 2313 2819 3109 
Equilibrium 2289 2790 3109 
The absolute total surplus does not account for the fact that larger markets exhibit a greater 
potential for generating surplus, as the expected minimum costs are lower. Therefore, we also 
compute relative total surplus as the ratio between attained and maximal total surplus. The 
results appear in table 6. The table shows that in all treatments most of the possible surplus is 
extracted from the market, where duopolies perform somewhat worse than oligopolies with 
more than two firms. Moving from two to three firms induces a larger increase in surplus ex-
traction than increasing the number further from three to four firms. However, all differences 
including the latter are significant at ?  = 0.01 (one-sided) or lower, according to Fisher’s two-
sample randomisation test. The fact that relative efficiency increases with the number of firms 
indicates that the absolute efficiency advantage of more firms is not only induced by the 
greater potential of generating surplus, which stems from the fact that the lowest unit cost is 
                                                                 
14 In some sense, these calculations are hypothetical, for consumers were not represented by real subjects. If only 
the payoffs of real subjects are considered, efficiency – then the sum of all firms’ profit – is maximised if the 
lowest-cost firm alone produces and it charges the monopoly price given its unit costs. 
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typically the lower the more firms there are in the market. More aggressive bidding also con-
tributes to higher efficiency. 
It is striking that both absolute and relative efficiencies are very close to the figures achieved 
in the theoretical equilibrium. The binomial test, applied to the difference between observed 
and predicted surplus in the individual sessions, cannot reject the null hypothesis of no differ-
ence at any conventional level. It seems that the efficiency-enhancing effect of more aggres-
sive bidding is just cancelled out by the loss in cost efficiency. Notice that in equilibrium it is 
always guaranteed that the firm(s) with the lowest costs serve all the demand, whereas this is 
not always the case in the experimental markets. In fact, in on average 5.25 out of 50 rounds 
(or 10.5%) in duopolies, 6.33 rounds (12.7%) in triopolies, and 6.72 rounds (13.4%) in tet-
rapolies at least one firms that does not have the lowest costs produces positive quantities.15 
Thus, while most of the time the most cost efficient firm(s) serve all the demand, occasional 
displacements reduce efficiency to the extent that similar surplus levels as in equilibrium are 
observed, though firms tend to price more aggressively.  
Table 6. Average relative total surplus in the individual markets 
Group No. n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
82.37% 
82.51% 
86.84% 
87.56% 
87.73% 
88.07% 
90.25% 
91.26% 
92.19% 
93.65% 
96.59% 
98.89% 
91.68% 
92.14% 
92.48% 
94.20% 
94.85% 
95.76% 
95.89% 
96.02% 
97.51% 
93.83% 
95.00% 
95.67% 
95.85% 
96.43% 
96.75% 
97.00% 
97.21% 
97.32% 
98.06% 
98.23% 
 
Average 89.83% 94.50% 96.48% 
Equilibrium 89.09% 93.67% 95.99% 
3.5. Profits 
To conclude the presentation of our experimental data, we now look at the implications of our 
findings for firms’ profits. Table 7 shows average round profits for the different groups over 
the 50 rounds of the experiment, ordered from the lowest to the highest for each value of n. 
                                                                 
15 The difference between treatments is weakly significant (p = 0.07 one-sided) for the comparison between n = 2 
and n = 4. All other pairwise comparisons do not yield a significant result.  
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The table shows average round profits decreasing with the number of firms. For all pairwise 
comparisons, Fisher’s two-sample randomisation test rejects the null hypothesis of equal av-
erage round profits at a significance level lower than ?  = 0.001 (one-sided). Thus, our data 
exhibit a clear and strong tendency towards profits decreasing with n.16 
As experimental firms tend to charge prices with lower profit margins than predicted by the 
theoretical equilibrium, profits are considerably lower than would result from equilibrium 
play. 
Table 7. Average profit per round 
Group No. n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
210.9 
321.1 
362.2 
367.6 
385.4 
456.5 
460.9 
472.6 
484.6 
517.8 
572.9 
580.7 
180.3 
180.6 
191.0 
198.0 
231.6 
235.3 
246.2 
246.8 
258.0 
123.2 
128.0 
138.3 
148.2 
151.0 
155.4 
161.8 
163.7 
164.5 
175.2 
198.2 
Average 432.8 218.6 155.2 
Equilibrium 572.5 373.7 259.5 
4. Conclusions 
We report on an experiment examining price levels and the relation between these levels and 
the number of firms in a price competition environment with uncertainty about competitors’ 
costs. Our results show that average market prices are decreasing and that total surplus is in-
creasing in the number of firms; in addition, average market prices stay above marginal cost 
for different numbers of firms. To this extent, our experimental data back the model proposed 
by Spulber (1995) as a satisfactory resolution of the Bertrand paradox.  
Our experimental data show that if one relaxes the assumption of complete information on 
rivals’ costs, pricing behaviour appears more intuitive than the one in the standard Bertrand 
game: We observe positive profits which are the higher the fewer competitors there are. 
                                                                 
16 Part of this effect can be attributed to the fact that a firm will sell fewer times in larger markets. The average 
profit in case that the firm does make a non-zero profit is 852.0 in duopolies, 656.4 in triopolies, and 615.9 in 
tetrapolies. The difference between n = 2 and either of n = 3 and n = 4 is significant at ?  = 0.01 (one-sided), the 
difference between n = 3 and n = 4 is not significant. 
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Competition is still strong, as pricing tends to be even more aggressive  than in the strategic 
equilibrium. This improves consumers’ situation, but it does so at a twofold price for produc-
ers: They suffer from lower profit margins, and, in addition, from occasional displacements 
when the producing firm is not the most cost-efficient. With respect to total surplus, consumer 
benefits and producer losses – as compared with equilibrium – just cancel each other out.  
Of course, our results cannot be a conclusive investigation of pricing behaviour in oligopolies 
with cost uncertainty. To keep things simple, we started with a symmetric framework that 
does not take differences in the individual firms’ characteristics into account. In the wider 
world, structural asymmetries between firms are common, but they add substantial complex-
ity to the model. Further, we model cost uncertainty in the very stylised way, as random 
draws independent for each firm and every round. Uncertainty about competitors’ costs seems 
a very natural assumption for real- life oligopolies, but, as costs are determined by factors like 
technology or input prices, changes may not affect the individual firms in a completely inde-
pendent manner, neither may they be completely uncorrelated over time. A richer model of 
price competition under cost uncertainty therefore should allow for cost levels evolving dy-
namically, and for competitors’ costs to be affiliated. We do believe, however, that the in-
sights from this simple setting can contribute to a broader research agenda on oligopolistic 
competition under uncertainty. 
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Appendix: The Written Instructions (n = 4) 
(other treatments analogous) 
General information  
We thank you for coming to the experiment. The purpose of this session is to study how people make 
decisions in a particular situation. During the session it is not permitted to talk or communicate with 
the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your 
desk to answer it. During the session you will earn money. At the end of the session the amount you 
have earned will be paid to you in cash. Payments are confidential, we will not inform any of the other 
participants of the amount you have earned. In the following, all amounts of money are denominated 
in talers, the experimental currency unit. 
In the experiment you take the role of a firm producing a good. There are four firms serving the mar-
ket. One firm is you, the other three firms are three other participants you are matched with. You will 
be matched with the same participants throughout the experiment. In every round, all firms post a 
price they ask per unit of the good. 
The experiment consists of 50 rounds, each structured as follows.  
Demand 
The buyers of the good are simulated by the computer. Their behaviour is as follows.  
All customers buy only from a firm that offers the lowest price. If two firms ask different prices, they 
do not buy anything from the firm asking for the higher price.  
The buyers are willing to buy the more units the lower the price is. At a price of 99 talers per unit or 
higher, no units can be sold. For each taler that the price is lower than 99, the demand for the good 
increases by one unit. Thus, at a price of zero talers, buyers are willing to buy 99 units of the good.  
The demand is allocated to the firm(s) offering the lowest price. If more than one firm asks the same 
price, all firms asking the lowest price are allocated equal shares of the demand for that price. 
Costs 
Each unit a firm produces causes a cost to the firm. The cost per unit varies from round to round and is 
likely to be different for each firm. In particular, the unit costs are drawn randomly at the start of each 
round, independently for each firm, from all integer numbers between 0 and 99 inclusively, where all 
numbers are equally likely.  
Your total costs are the number of units you produce and sell times the unit costs. There are no fixed 
costs. 
Decisions  
In each round you and the other participants that you are matched to will each separately make a deci-
sion. This decision will consist in choosing a price between 0 and 99. When you have decided on a 
price please enter it into the computer. 
Earnings  
After each round, buyers’ demand is computed according to the pattern described above, i.e. the mar-
ket demand, in units, is 99 minus the lowest price. The firm asking the lowest price produces and sells 
the market demand. If two or more firms ask the same lowest price, the market demand is shared 
equally among these firms. 
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Your revenue is the number of units you sell times the price you have asked. Your total costs are the 
number of units you sell times the unit cost that have been drawn randomly for that round. Your round 
profit is your revenue minus your total costs. Notice that you can make a loss if you ask a price that is 
lower than your unit costs. 
Firms whose price has not been the lowest make a profit of zero. 
Payments  
At the beginning of the experiment each of you will receive 3000 talers credited to your talers ac-
count. After each round, your round payoffs are credited to your talers account. At any moment during 
the experiment you will be able to check your talers account on the screen. 
Should you accumulate losses such that your taler account is negative, you are bankrupt and cannot 
continue participating in this experiment.  
At the end of the experiment your total payoff in your talers account will be converted into Sterling at 
the exchange rate of £1 for every 1000 talers. 
